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Right to closure of industries: A comment
BABUMATHEW

1. Introduction
For well over a decade now we have been engaged in the debate whether tht
right to close down a business is a fundamental right of the employer and whether
legislative restrictions upon this right are constitutionally valid or not. In the year 1978
the Supreme Court, in Excel Wear v. Union of Indial struck down sectioJ:l25-0 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as being constitutionally bad and invalid for violation of
Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution ofIndia.
Parliament stepped into the field once again in the year 1982, and enacted a new
section 25-0 incorporating several changes in the light of the Supreme Court's
observations in Excel Wear case.2
In 1985, a Single Bench of the Karnataka High Court struck down the new
section 25-0 on the ground that it suffered from the same vice as the earlier law? The
matter came up before the Division Bench in appeal, and was decided upon on 21st
February, 1989 in Union of India' v. Stumpp Sclteule and Somappa Ltd.4 This court
held the new section 25-0 as valid by applying the ratio of Excel Wear
differently from the Single Judge and concluded that the new section was procedurally
cured, and it was now only in the nature of a reasonable restriction upon the
right 'to close under Article 19(1)(g). During the last decade since the decislon
of the Supreme Court in Excel Wear case, the magnitude of the problem of closure
has multiplied several-fold. It is today a matter of national importance and the
many new dimensions of this problem will have to be re-examined afresh by the
Supreme Court, in view of sharply conflicting conclusions reached by different
High Courts.
In this comment we examine the views of the Supreme Court and the Karnataka
High Court on section 2~0 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and at tl:}.esame time
we take a look at the effect of continuous socio-economic pressures being generated
on the Industrial Disputes Act through the last four decades.
1.
2.

3.
4.

AIR 1979 SC 25.
Through the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982 (46 of 1982) Parliament introduced a n"·w
section 25-0. Additional procedural requirements such as hearing, written reasons for the decision,
review or reference to a tribunal were provided. The Gove)'llment was also required to pass Its
orders within 60 days failing which pemlission would be deemed to h<\vebeen given. Fur\her, the
order passed would be valid only for a period of one year..
W.P.Nos. 104-93and 104-94of 1985.(Reported in ILR Kamataka at p. 3528).
Writ Appeal Nos. 2149 and 2150 of 1985.
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2. The Supreme Court's views
The mast impartant decisian an the questian .of clasure was rendered by the
Supreme Caurt in Excel Wear v. Union of India.S One may agree, disagree .or dispute
the ratia in this case, but nane can deny that almost all the crucial questions
cannected with closure have been gone into by the court. We must therefore
necessarily get into a detailed analysis of this case.
To begin with let us loak at three important questions to which the court gave
very clear answers. The first question is whether the right to close down a business is a
fundamental right or not? After considering the various propositions put forward by
the employers and the labour unions, the court came to the following conclusion at
para 20 of their judgment:
"It is not quite correct to say that a right ta close down a business can be equated
or placed at par as high as the right not to carryon a business at all. The extreme
praposition urged on behalf of the employers by equating the two rights and
placing them at par is not quite apposite and sound. Equally, so, or rather more
emphatically we da reject the extreme contention put forward on behalf of the
Labour Unions that right to close down a business is not an integral part of the
right to carryon business, but is a right appurtenant to the ownership of property
or that it is not a fundamental right at all. It is wrong to say tltat an employer Itas
no right to close down a business once he starts it. If he has, it cannot but be a
fundamental right embedded in the right to carry on any business guaranteed under
Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution."
(Emphasis added)

The second question is whether there can be a reasonable restriction upon the
fundamental right to clase down a business. Here again the court comes out with a
clear cut answer at para. 21 and states as fallaws:
"We now praceed ta examine whether the restrictions imposed under the
impugned law are reasonable within the meaning of Article 19(6). This is
undoubtedly on the footing, as held by us above, that the right to close down a
business is an integral part of the right to carryon a business. But as no right is
absolute in its scope, so is tlte nature of this rigltt. It can certainly be restricted,
regulated or controlled by law in tlte interest of tlte general public".

(Emphasis added)
Let us now take a look at the third questian. Does the old section 25-0 of the
Industrial Disputes Act as intraduced by Act 32 of 1976 suffer from any vice? The
court answers this question alsa in na uncertain terms at para 30 .oftheir judgement:
"What we are concerned with at the present juncture is to see whether the law as
enacted suffers from any vice of excessive and unreasonable restriction. In our
(Emphasis added)
opinion it does suffer."
Having thus seen that the· Court has answered the above three questions
unambiguausly in the affirmative, we now proceed into the area of cantroversy. Did
5.

AIR 1979 SC 25.
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section 25-0 suffer from both substantive as well as procedural
only from one of the above and if so which one?
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vice, or did it suffer

Unlike clear-cut answers to the first three questions, we do not find a clear-cut
answer to this last question. The answer is spread over ten paragraphs extending from
para 24 to para 34 of the judgment. In each of these paragraphs, the court discusses a
particular concept and arrives at a certain conclusion. It mixes up both substantive
issues as well as procedural issues and this is the reason why different judges and
different courts have interpreted the ratio of this decision in different ways. In fact
here is a case where both parties, viz., capital and labour rely upon the same decision
to arrive at different conclusions.
It is possible on a careful reading of the judgment to separate the substantive
issues from the procedural ones, and also to examine the different concepts which the
court really considered. Basically three concepts were analysed. The concept of
socialism, the concept of public interest and the effect of refusing permission to close.
The opinion of the court on all these three issues is very critical to the entire judgment
and, hence we shall examine this discussion in some greater detail.

3. The concept of socialism
By discussing the concept of socialism, the court attempts to situate the
controversy regarding closure against our socio-economic background. Unfortunately,
the discussion is handled by the court in a very unsatisfactory manner. The attempt to
distinguish between doctrinaire socialism and pragmatic socialism, does not really
help us. What would be more useful is to distinguish between scientific socialism,
under which private ownership of the means of production is totally abolishd, and
various brands of Utopian Socialism including the Fabian variety, as in our case, where
the framework of planned economic development envisages a definite role for the public
sector as well as the private sector. It is against this reality that we may come to the
conclusion, as the court does, that the private sector has a right to exist in our mixed
economy. This, no doubt, cannot be disputed but the discussion cannot end here. It
needs to be carried further . We need to ask the question whether a private sector which is
the recipient of overwhelmingly large public funds from financial institutions and
nationalised banks has an unrestricted right in respect of their enterprise. After Escort's
case we all know that even the giants of private capital in India bring in very marginal
contribution of capital and as a result, they arc really indulging in private l11anagement
of public capital and therefore they not only owe a responsibilityto society to run their
enterprise efficiently, but more than that, the Government has a duty to monitor the
utilisation of public funds by the private sector and make them publicly answerable,
when sickness or closure results. From this angle we arrive at the opposite conclusion
of what the honourable Supreme Court arrived at when they said at para 24:
"But so long as the private ownership of an industry is recognised and governs an
overwhelmingly large proportion 01 our economic structure is it possible to say
that principles of socialism and social justice can be pushed to such an extreme
so as to ignore completely or to a very large extent the interests of another
section of the public namely the private owners of the undertakings?"

]\"LSJ-14
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It is no doubt true that private ownership governs an overwhelmingly large
proportion of our economic structure, but this is really done by borrowing public
funds, and utilising or misutilising the same. In the case of sick industries, studies
conducted by the Reserve Bank of India go to show that mismanagement
and
diversion of funds, are the main causes for sickness in industry, and not labour trouble
as popularly believed.
At a later stage in the judgment, i.e., at para 34, the court once again refers to
socialism and states that taking over of an undertaking by the State may be consistent
with the object of making India a Socialist State. "But not to permit the employer to
close down is essentially an interference with his fundamental right to carryon the
business". Here again, our brand of socialism does not consist of nationalisation alone,
it consists of social control and regulation to a very large extent. Therefore, if a
particular provision of law does not lead to take over by the Stat<,:,that alone does not
vitiate the goals of Constitutional Socialism. The question is whether section 25-0 is
in the nature of a reasonable restriction leading to a definite social good, even from
the point of view of the future of the enterprise itself. Indeed it is so. Section 25-0 is
meant for applying the brakes on an employer, who hastily seeks to put an end to his
enterprise
while simultaneously
breaking the life line of employer-employee
relationship. If we therefore look at section 25-0 in the light of present day
developments including the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985
(referred to as SICA, hereafter) we will see that the restriction imposed is not only
reasonable but even necessary for the common good.

4. The concept of public interest
The court discusses this concept in para 25 of its judgment, and the related
concept of balance of interest at para 29. An attempt is made to weigh different
interests in the judicial balance. It takes into consideration the interests of labour, and
the problems of unemployment associated with closure. It rightly comes to the
conclusion that if protection against unemployment is the sole criterion, then, no
closure would ever be possible. The other side of the coin is also considered and, the
most pertinent question is posed. Can they (the employers) be compelled to go on
incurring losses year after year? Indeed this is a dogged question which has arisen
again and again before every forum where the question of closure has been seriously
considered. It is submitted that, absence of a satisfactory answer to this question has
conditioned all those who have been opposed to the continuance of section 25-0. But
this is no longer true. More than ten years ago when t~e decision in Excel Wear case
was pronounced, or even much later when the single Judge of the Karnataka High
Court struck down the new section 25-0, there was no cogent answer to this question
and this is the reason why the judges argued that we can understand State take-over
but we cannot understand compulsion to run the enterprise.6 The Supreme Court
emphasised that this would lead to ruination of the employer. Today, however, the
situation is vastly different. Chapter III of the SICA provides the answers to this

6.

Cogent answers became really available only after the Sick Industrial
Provisions) Act, 1985 (SICA) came to be enacted as Act, 1 of 1986.

Companies
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question.7 If a particular unit is found viable, it may be revived under the same owner
through fresh infusion of funds, or it may be handed over to any other entrepreneur
or even to a workers co-operative. If the Board for Industrial and Financial
Reconstruction (BIFR) comes to the conclusion that the unit in question is not viable,
then winding-up proceedings will bring a finality to this vexed question.

5. The effect of refusing permission
We have already examined some aspects of this problem while examining the
concept of public interest. The Supreme Court is very worried with the effect of
refusing permission. It observes at para 26 that Chapter V-B never states anywhere
that the object of carrying on production can be achieved by refusing permission, and
further observes that it would be highly unreasonable to achieve such an object by
compulsion to produce. The same question is again considered at para 30 and the
court observed "to tell an employer to pay (minimum wages) and not to retire even if
. he cannot pay is pushing the matter to an extreme".
It is in this context that we must examine the very scheme of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, and also the various pressures to which this enactment has been
continuously subjected to during the last four decades and more. When this
enactment was introduced in 1947, it had the limited purpose of serving as a dispute
settlement machinery. Even now, if we take away Chapter V-A, V-B and V-C we
immediately recognise the original intent of the enactment. But, then, the Industrial
Disputes Act, is the main piece of legislation governing the relationship between ever
growing capital and labour in the country, and hence it is but natural that this piece of
legislation will always be subjected to the pressures of the changing situation on the
industrial front. Thus there have been over a dozen amendments to this enactment.8
Chapter V-A dealing with procedure for lay-off and retrenchment was introduced in
1953, closure compensation was introduced in 1957, limitation on payment of the
same was lifted in 1971, Chapter V-B, requiring permission for lay-off, retrenchment
and closure came in 1976 and so on. All these amendments which became necessary
because of socio-economic
pressures, deal with the entire range of questions
concerning job losses. We must therefore note, that the original purpose of the
enactment was dispute settlement pertaining to individual or collective disputes,
leading often to strikes and lock-outs. Now we have a new situation. The major
purpose of Chapters V-A and V-B is to regulate job losses, and the old machinery of
the Act is inadequate to meet the new purposes which have to be catered to.
Unless we understand this inevitable development, which has occurred over the
last four decades arising out of the changes and pressures generated in our economic
system, it is difficult to appreciate how an employer can be asked not to close down.
The logic is indeed quite simple. Section 25-0 helps the continuance of the
relationship between employer qnd employee to subsist, till the question of viability of
7.
8.

Chapter III of the SICA enables reference of a sick company to the Board for Industrial and
Financial Reconstruction, inquiry into a sick company, take over and handing over of a sick unit to
any person including a workers' co-operative, rehabilitation by giving financial assistance, etc.
'f!tere have been thirteen amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - in 1952, 1954, 1956
(two), 1957, 1964, 1965,1971, 1972, 1976, 1982 and 1984.
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the enterprise is finally decided. Unfortunately this critical question of viability cannot
be answered satisfactorily by the authorities under the Act, for it requires specialised
skill and expertise in matters of Finance, Marketing, Management, etc. Such a body
has indeed been created in the form of the Board for Industrial and Financial
Reconstruction under the SICA, and hence questions which did not have answers
earlier on, do have answers now. The effect of refusing permission is therefore no
longer to compel ruination - it may lead to revival of production, employment and
economic prosperity or bring about finality through winding-up and if investigation
proves misapplication and mismanagement, as is often the case in the opinion of the
Reserve Bank of India then it will hopefully lead to the fIxing up of liability and public
exposure of even ·the private sector and this cannot be evaded despite employers
invoking their fundamental right under section 19(1)(g).
What we discussed above really pertains to matters of a substantive nature
expressed in the form of the three concepts. It may already be noted that the courts
reasoning in respect of all these substantive issues naturally went against the
constitutional validity of section 25-0. Most of the fIndings of the court were really in
respect of substantive issues, though procedural matters especially were also
considered. We therefore turn our attention to these procedural issues now.

6. Cryptic orders not subject to scrutiny, review or appeal
While applying for permission to close, the employer is required to furnish
elaborate details pertaining to the performance of the enterprise for the last few years
and also pertaining to current assets, finances, stocks, market, etc. Despite all this
detailed information being collected, the authority passes a cryptic order which often
reproduces routine terminology such as "the reasons for the intended closure are
prejudicial to public interest" (para 25) etc. The Supreme Court expressed its
annoyance about such orders in no uncertain terms and observed that the old section
25"0 did not have any provision for such orders being scrutinised by higher
authorities or tribunals; either in appeal or revision or review. These are additional
procedural grounds on which the impugned section was struck down.
If we reflect upon the problem of cryptic orders we must realise that authorities
under the Act very often are not equipped and do not have the machinery to really
inquire into questions of viability and the like. As already mentioned, it is really a
body like the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction which has the
competence to inquire into these matters, and the SICA provides that even the Board
for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction may direct questions of viability to be
investigated by anyone of the financial agencies which has the necessary expertise.
When such is the case, it is not easy to expect a well reasoned order from the .
authority under the Industrial Disputes Act. We are'I1lUS faced with a situation where
Governmental
intervention is necessary but the authorities .mder the Industrial
Disputes Act do not have the expertise for reasons a~,cady explained above. It is
necessary to ponder over this bottleneck a little more. When Parliament enacted
section 25-0 for the second time, it provided for a reference to the Industrial
Tribunal. This was obviously 0.11 improvisation meanr to save the constitutional validity
of the section, but all the same we must read it along with section 11(5) of the
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Industrial Disputes Act which contemplates the help of assessors to the Tribunal for
arriving at a conclusion.9 In other words, there is an indirect mechanism already
provided to draw on experts for a particular type of investigation - this shows the
opening for further legislative innovation and judicial activism in order to solve the
problem, by referring the issue of viability to a competent body like the Board for
Industrial and Financial Reconstruction for its expert opinion. Having examined the
different grounds considered by the Supreme Court we now turn our attention to the
question posed earlier. Did the Supreme Court strike down old section 25-0 for
substantive reasons or procedural ones or for both?
The answer to this question has already been traced in the earlier part of this
comment. The Supreme Court's decision has undoubtedly been conditioned by its
views on three concepts pertaining to socialism, public interest and effect of refusing
permission. In addition the court also found procedural defects such as possibility of
passing a cryptic order, no definite time limit, lack of provision to scrutinise, review, or
appeal from the decision of the authority contributing to the invalidity of section 25-0.
That both substantive and procedural grounds weighed with the Supreme Court
is clear from the following observation at para 31:
"All the attendant circumstances must be taken into consideration and one
cannot dissociate the actual contents of the restrictions from the manner of their
imposition or the mode of putting them into practice."
That such is the opinion of the court is further confirmed by their observation at vara
25 to the effect that "such an unreasonable order was possible to be passed because of
the unreasonableness of the law".

7. The Karnataka High Court's view
Let us now see how the ratio of Excel Wear has been applied in the Karnataka
High Court. The learned Single Judge while giving his finding in Stump, Scheule alld
Somappa Ltd. v. State of Kal7lataka culled out seven points as constituting the ratio in
Excel Wear case.lO But while applying this ratio to the facts of the case before him an
even finer ratio was derived and applied which is the following:
"But the real ground for striking down section 25-0 was that the exercise of the
right was made dependent on the permission of the Government, which could be
refused even if the reasons for closure were good."
The Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court reversed this view in a batch of
Writ Appeals involving the same parties.ll At para 15 of the judgment they rightly
observed that "Necessity of permission from an independent
authority like the
Government was not held as destroying the fundamental right of the employer,
anywhere in Excel Wear case" and hence the Division Bench proceeded to differ with
the view of the Single Judge regarding the ratio of the decision.

9.
10.

This was incorporated through
AIR 1979 SC 25, at para II.

11.

Ibid.

an amendment

carried out in 1956.
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But then what exactly did the Division Bench do? It held that the new section
25-0 was cured of procedural defects and hence valid. It came to the conclusion that
Excel Wear did not strike down the earlier section 25-0 for substantive reasons. With
respect it is submitted that this view of the matter as already elaborated above is not
quite correct. This decision while arriving at the right conclusion suffers from the·
pressure generated by the superior court in Excel Wear case and therefore finds itself
forced to ignore the substantive grounds on which also the earlier section 25-0 was
struck down by the Supreme Court. Having placed itself in this predicament the
Division Bench tries to get over the difficulty by observing that the Government while
granting or refusing permission will have to be guided by the following dictum:
"the factors stated in section 25-0(2) which are to be considered,
understood in the light of the decision in Ex:cel Wear."

are to be

8. Need for review
This takes us back to the situation that existed 10 years ago, when the Supreme
Court's thinking was conditioned by many substantive que~tions to which they had no
answers, especially the dogged question - Can an employer be compelled to go on
incurring losses year after year? As already explained· these questions now have
answers especially in view of the SICA, 1985. Hence for a true and correct
interpretation of section 25-0 it is necessary that this section be read along with
Chapter III of the SICA, 1985 and on doing so we will find that all the relevant
questions raised in Excel Wear now have new answers, requiring the Supreme Court's
decision to be overruled on virtually all grounds, when the new section 25-0 comes up
for consideration.
After all, what does section 25~0 deal with in our society today? It deals with a
very acute problem of our society. The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, was designed to
deal with problems of industrial relations and while closure is certainly a fundamental
problem in industrial relations, at the same time it has a much larger dimension. It
goes to the very root of our economic system - the impact of modernisation - the
type of industrialization
which suits India - the stage and extent to which we
can proceed, the model of self-reliance versus free enterprise, the generation of a
'Swiss Bank Money' economy compounding the already flourishing 'Black Money
Economy' etc.
In other words the magnitude of the problem of job-losses due to industrial
sickness is staggering and such a serious malady of our socio-economic system cannot
simply be resolved by the judiciary resorting to the usual mechanism of testing the
validity of a particular section in isolation. We must look beyond the parameters of
the Industrial Disputes Act to find a solution. Indeed the SICA, 1985 will be of great
help but above all we will require creative application of the spirit and ideology of the
Constitution as enshrined especially in the Preamble and the Directive Principles of
State Policy.
In additon there are many other reasons for the Supreme Court to overrule its
decision in the Excel Wear case. In the year 1978-79 there were only 22,000 and odd
cases of closure. Since then, i.e., over a period of a decade now the number of

Right to closure of industries

203

closures has increased nearly eight-fold, the amount of public money locked up in
these sick units is nearly 6,000 crores now and all this must be seen against the
Reserve Bank of India's finding that "sickness has become a profitable business". The
factor of public interest has thus derived a new and very pertinent dimension quite
different and almost the opposite of the one that weighed in the mind of the Supreme
Court, a decade ago.
As all of us know, refusal of permission to close alone does not solve the whole
of the problem, but when this brake is applied in conjunction with the work which the
BIFR is expected to do, a whole new range of possibilities do arise, as in the Kamani
takeover case. In case of genuine and inevitable closures however, the Government
will have to devise schemes of re-training and re-deployment
coupled with a
redundancy fond. Section 25-0 needs to be strengthened further - i.e., the net will
have to be made even tighter for erring employers to be brought around and the
amendments proposed in the Industrial Relations Bill, 1988 could very well be a good
beginning.t2

* * * *

12.

Thc Tradc Unions and thc Industrial Disputes (Amcndmcnt)
Bill, 1988 sought to furthcr tightcn
closurc provisions by proposing amcndments to section 25-0 and 25-R and by sccking to introduce
30-13. Thcse amcndmcnts
suggcst that an application undcr section 25-0 should be
Scction
accompanied
by an irrcvocablc bank guarantce for payment of all wagcs and ducs to workmen.
·l"hc othcr intcntion was to prcscribe a minimum of 6 months imprisonmcnt
and a finc of at least
Rs. 5.000 for violation of c10surc provisions by the employer.

